The Ho Tribe and the Kolhan Region

• The Kolhan region, primarily inhabited by the Ho tribe, was never brought under effective control by the Mughals or Marathas.
• Even the Singh rulers of Porahat had little influence over them. The Ho people did not pay taxes to them, although they exchanged occasional gifts.
• Due to their historical independence, the Ho developed a strong warrior culture and a deep love for freedom.

The Strategic Use of the Ho Tribe

• Over time, the Ho people were manipulated into becoming tools for the Porahat kings in their battles against rival chiefs.
• The Ho launched retaliatory attacks against the Nagvanshi territories of Chotanagpur, especially due to previous assaults in 1770 and 1800 by the Nagvanshi rulers.
• This caused security issues along the trade routes passing through Kolhan, deterring both travelers and merchants.

British Intervention in Singhbhum

• The unrest caught the attention of the British East India Company.
• In 1819, some Singhbhum rulers accepted British suzerainty and requested help, citing their inability to control the Ho despite ruling over them in theory.
• In 1820, Major Roughsedge entered the Ho territory with a military force. The operation was partially successful, with many Ho warriors being killed.

Continued Resistance and British Response

• Another detachment led by Roughsedge suffered a significant loss while assisting Singhbhum rulers in tax collection.
• As a result, Colonel Richard led a larger campaign in 1821. After a month of fighting, the Ho agreed to a compromise:
  • They accepted British overlordship.
  • Agreed to pay 50 paise per plough annually for five years, increasing to one rupee thereafter.
  • Promised safety for merchants and travelers on Kolhan routes.
  • Allowed settlement of all castes in their villages.

Rebellion Rekindled

• Despite the agreement, tensions with Singhbhum rulers persisted.
• The Ho, disliking subjugation, attacked Dhalbhum, Chotanagpur Khas, and Bamanghati.
• During the Kol Uprising of 1831-32, the Ho played an active role.

Final Suppression and Direct Control

• Acting on Wilkinson’s advice, the British launched another offensive in late 1836.
• A four-month conflict followed, ending in February 1837 with the Ho tribe surrendering.
• This time, the British established direct control, collecting taxes themselves and placing the region under a new administrative unit led by a British officer.

The Bigger Picture: Establishment of British Rule in Jharkhand

• It took 72 years after receiving Diwani rights in 1765 for the British to firmly establish governance over the Ho territory.
• On August 12, 1765, Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II granted Diwani rights of Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha to the East India Company.
• Since Chotanagpur was a part of Bihar, the Company also claimed the right to collect taxes from Ramgarh, Khadagdiha, Kendi, and Kunda.

Threat of the Marathas

• The revival of Maratha power under Madhav Rao (1761-62) increased threats to Bengal and Bihar.
• The Marathas used Ramgarh as a base for their incursions, prompting the Company to bring all Chotanagpur rulers under control.

Divide and Rule in Ramgarh

• In 1769, Captain Camac entered Chotanagpur and in 1771, subdued the zamindars of Khadagdiha and Palamau.
• Camac was helped by Dheeran Narayan Singh of Kunda, who was later rewarded with tax exemptions.
• The Company initially hesitated to act against the Chero rulers due to instructions from Calcutta, but later shifted strategy.

Capture of Palamau Fort

• The British decided to support Gopal Rai, son of Chhatrapal Rai, to take over Palamau Fort.
• Chiranjit Rai and Jayanath Singh had seized the fort. The Company demanded its surrender via Ghulam Hussain.
• After failed negotiations, Captain Camac began military preparations in January 1771.
• On January 27, he attacked Chainpur, and by March 21, 1771, the Chero chiefs surrendered and fled to Ramgarh.

Rewards and Recognition

• Camac and his allies, including Jaimangala Singh of Palamau, Dheeran Narayan of Kunda, and Narayan Singh of Siris Kutumba, were honored and rewarded.

The Tax Conflict in Ramgarh

• The Patna Council proposed a three-year lease (1772–1775) at ₹21,000 annually to Mukul Singh of Ramgarh, with an additional ₹23,228 in arrears.
• Mukund Singh refused to sign, citing his long-standing independence and the unaffordable terms.

Mukund Singh’s Defiance and Maratha Support

• Mukund Singh sought military support from the Maratha ruler of Ratanpur, who sent forces to aid Tori and Kunda against the British.
• In retaliation, Camac had Thakur Tej Singh claim the Ramgarh throne and captured Kunda. Kendi also accepted British authority.

Conflict and Capture of Ramgarh

• War broke out in September–October 1772 between Tej Singh and Mukund Singh.
• Tej Singh was supported by British-aligned rajas but failed and fled to Nawada.
• The British then ordered a direct attack on Ramgarh, with Camac and Tej Singh leading from different fronts.
• Mukund Singh offered no resistance, and Ramgarh was annexed into British territory.

Administrative Changes and Expansion

• In 1773, Ramgarh, Palamau, and Chotanagpur were merged into the Ramgarh District, under Camac’s charge.
• In 1774, Thakur Tej Singh was officially declared the Raja of Ramgarh.
• In 1780, a new district called “Ramgarh Hill Tracts” was formed with Sherghati and Chatra as alternating headquarters.
• Chapman was appointed as magistrate and collector. This district included Gaya, Manbhum, and Munger.

Formation of Southwest Frontier Agency

• Later, British officials proposed a new administrative setup:
  • Merging Palamau, main Chotanagpur, Jungle Mahals, and Midnapore into a single unit.
  • It was to be exempt from general regulation, aiming for more effective governance.
• This led to the formation of the Southwest Frontier Agency, which operated from 1834 to 1854.

The Lohardaga Agency and Early British Administration

• The headquarters of the British agency in the Chotanagpur region was established at Kisanpur, Lohardaga.
• Thomas Wilkinson was appointed as the first Agent of the Lohardaga Agency, directly responsible to the Governor-General.
• Lohardaga served as the chief district under this agency.
• Robert Ousley was appointed as the District Officer of Lohardaga.
• In 1854, the South-West Frontier Agency was abolished.
• The entire Chotanagpur region was brought under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal.
• A non-regulation province administrative structure was set up, offering the British flexibility to govern tribal-dominated areas differently.

Chutia Nagpur Division and Its Tributary States

• Under a single Commissioner, several districts and tributary states were governed:
  • Lohardaga, Hazaribagh, Manbhum, Singhbhum, Sarguja, Jaspur, Udaipur, Gangpur, and others.
• This commissionerate was named Chutia Nagpur.
• During the East India Company’s rule, Manbhum was a large region that included:
  • Jharia, Katras, Parra, Raghunathpur, Kari, Jhalda, Jaipur, Hesla, Balmundi, Ichagarh, Balarampur, Panchat, Abhiyangarh, Chatna, and Barabhum zamindaris.
• When Ferguson entered Manbhum in 1767, five powerful and semi-independent zamindars existed:
  • Manbhum, Barabhum, Supur, Abhiyangarh, and Chatna.
• The population of the area had become unruly and undisciplined, causing considerable resistance to British authority.
• Ferguson realized that military action was ineffective; instead:
  • A military detachment was stationed, and annual settlements were introduced.

Expansion into Singhbhum, Saraikela, and Kharsawan

• After Manbhum, the British targeted Singhbhum, Saraikela, and Kharsawan, though full control took several decades.
• In February 1837, the British, under Captain Wilkinson, attacked Singhbhum to suppress the Ho tribe.
• Villages like Ipilasingi and Panga were burnt down.
• The Ho population suffered heavily and eventually surrendered.
• Wilkinson established a separate administrative unit named Kolhan Government Estate.
  • The first Deputy Commissioner of Kolhan was Tickell.
• For better administration, Wilkinson formulated 31 administrative rules in 1833, known as “Wilkinson Rules”.

Geographic Details of Saraikela and Kharsawan

• Saraikela covered an area of approximately 700 sq. km, and Kharsawan spanned 225 sq. km.
• Saraikela’s boundaries:
  • North: Manbhum
  • West: Kharsawan and Kolhan
  • South: Mayurbhanj Estate
  • East: Singhbhum’s Dhalbhum Subdivision
• Kharsawan’s boundaries:
  • North: Ranchi
  • East: Saraikela
  • South: Kolhan
• In 1934, both regions were formally incorporated into British India:
  • Saraikela came under the supervision of a British Resident posted in Odisha.
  • Eastern States Agency took charge of Kharsawan from April 1934.

British Rule in Santhal Pargana and the Pahariya Tribe

• The British initially focused on establishing peace among the Pahariya tribe, living in the Rajmahal hills.
• The British referred to them as “Highlanders”, “Hill Men”, or “Hill Races”.
• In the northern areas, they were known as “Mal”, and collectively called “Malers” to distinguish them from other hill tribes.
• This tribe primarily survived through hunting, raiding, and cattle theft.
• They avoided regular labor and were considered lawless.
• The Mughal rulers had placed them under mansabdars, particularly the Kheturi family of Manihari.
  • The family’s founder allegedly helped Akbar’s general Man Singh pass through the hills during the Bengal campaign and was rewarded with a manasabdari jagir.
  • The jagir included lands where the Malers resided.
• Over time, the Kheturi family extended control eastward up to Rajmahal and westward to Colgong and Godda.

The Maler Uprising and Aftermath

• Relations between the Malers and the Kheturi family remained cordial until the 18th century, when disturbances began.
• The Malers murdered several members of the Kheturi family and attacked Lakragarh fort.
• They launched attacks on various villages, but political instability prevented a strong British response.
• The Great Famine of 1770 exacerbated tensions:
  • Soldiers guarding the outposts abandoned their posts.
  • The fertile plains were left defenseless, and the Malers began systematic raids.
  • Their survival skills helped them withstand the famine, unlike the plains people.
• Some attacks were encouraged by rival zamindars to settle scores with neighbors.
• Their influence became so severe that:
  • Villages were deserted.
  • No boats dared to stay overnight on the southern bank of the Ganga due to fear.
  • Even government messengers using the Rajmahal-Teliagadhi route were often robbed or killed.

Bishop Heber’s Testimony (1824)

• In 1824, Bishop Heber noted:
  • For over 40 years, there was a constant conflict between the Malers and the plains farmers.
  • This highlights the long-standing strife and lawlessness in the region caused by tribal resistance and British administrative shortcomings.

British Campaigns in the Rajmahal Hills: The Stories of Captain Brooke, Captain Brown, and Augustus Cleveland

The late 18th century was a pivotal time in the history of Jharkhand’s Rajmahal Hills, where British officers tried various methods to curb the terror of local tribal warriors and rebellious zamindars. Below is a comprehensive narrative, broken down into key bullet points, about how British officers such as Captain Brooke, Captain Brown, and Augustus Cleveland worked to suppress unrest and establish civil order.

Captain Brooke’s Military Governance (1771–1774)

• In 1771, Captain Brooke was appointed the Military Governor of the jungle-covered region between Munger (north) and Bhagalpur (south).
• The appointment was made on the advice of General Barker, a military advisor, in response to growing tribal unrest and zamindari rebellions.
• Brooke was given command of a special force of 800 soldiers.
• His mission was to:
  • End the violence and anarchy.
  • Restore law and order.
  • Encourage peasants to return to agriculture.
  • Ensure long-term peace.
• Between 1771–1773:
  • Brooke implemented Warren Hastings’ policies effectively.
  • He bombarded the fort of Tiyur in 1773 and launched several successful military campaigns against the hill tribes, causing fragmentation in their groups.
  • Captured tribal rebels were treated well to earn their trust.
  • He encouraged them to settle in the plains and take up farming.
• By 1774, he reported to Warren Hastings that at least 283 villages had been re-established between Udhwa and Barkop.
• Hastings, in a letter to the Board of Directors, expressed pride that:
  • Law and order had been established in what was once an inaccessible region favorable only to plunderers.
  • The population had become civilized.
  • Revenue losses from loot were not only controlled but had started improving.
• Despite his short tenure, Captain Brooke was remembered as a harbinger of civilization in the Rajmahal Hills.

Captain James Brown’s Contributions (1774–1778)

• Captain Brown succeeded Brooke and led the hill force from 1774 to 1778.
• During his command, he focused on:
  • Suppressing revolts by Bhuiya tribes around Laxmipur with the help of local zamindar Jagannath Dev.
  • Restoring law and order in the areas of Ambar and Sultanabad.
• However, his lasting contribution lay in his administrative insights:
  • Brown proposed a governance model recognizing the traditional tribal system of the Paharias.
• Tribal Administrative Structure:
  • Tribes were divided into parganas or tappas.
  • Each pargana had a chief called Sardar.
  • Each Sardar had one or more assistants called Naib.
  • Villages were led by heads known as Manjhi.
• Brown’s Recommendations:
  • Recognize and involve Sardars and Manjhis in administrative affairs.
  • All government transactions with Paharias should occur via Sardars and Manjhis.
  • Establish markets at the foothills to encourage interaction with plains people.
  • Provide funds to safeguard public roads that passed through tappas.
  • Reinstate the chowkibandi (outpost) system discontinued in 1772.
  • Outposts should be under government-appointed thanedars, with sazwals (divisional superintendents) supervising them.
  • Grant land to incapacitated sepoys in the plains on the condition that they assist the police during tribal raids.
• This plan was approved in 1778, but before implementation, Brown was replaced.

Augustus Cleveland’s Humanitarian Approach (1779–1780)

• Augustus Cleveland took charge from Captain Brown in 1779 and became the Collector of Bhagalpur.
• In his letters to Warren Hastings, Cleveland expressed admiration for the simplicity and honesty of the Paharias.
• He accepted their assertion of historical independence and decided to pursue a policy of justice and humanity.
• Cleveland’s early policy saw 47 tribal Sardars and chiefs willingly cooperate with the government.
• He emphasized that lasting peace in the hills, especially near Ambar, had not been seen in years.

Cleveland’s 1780 Proposal for Lasting Peace

On 21 November 1780, Cleveland submitted a detailed plan to Hastings, aiming to integrate the tribal people into society:

1. Formation of a Tribal Archery Force:
   • Each Manjhi (approx. 400) would supply one or more archers.
   • Every 50 archers would be led by a chief responsible for discipline.
2. Command and Control:
   • The tribal archers would operate directly under the Collector of Bhagalpur.
   • They were to treat enemies of the British government as their own and help suppress rebellious zamindars and hostile Ghatwals.
3. Salaries and Uniforms:
   • Chiefs: ₹5/month.
   • Regular soldiers: ₹3/month.
   • Manjhis supplying men: ₹2/month.
   • Uniforms: Two turbans, two waistbands, two shirts, two pairs of undergarments, and one purple jacket per year.
4. Cost Estimate:
   • The estimated annual cost of this force was ₹29,440.
   • Although expensive and not immediately revenue-generating, Cleveland argued it would:
     • Civilize forest-dwelling people.
     • Establish peace.
     • Reassure the surrounding plains population.
5. Final Government Response:
   • Hastings rejected the archery army due to cost.
   • However, he approved other proposals:
     • ₹10/month for each Sardar.
     • ₹5/month for each Naib.
     • No allowance for Manjhis, due to the threat from raids in the south.
   • Northern Manjhis (near Ambar and Sultanabad) accepted the grants; southern Manjhis declined.

The Cleveland System and the Transformation of the Pahariya Region (1780–1837)

The British administration’s dealings with the tribal Pahariya people in the Rajmahal Hills during the late 18th and early 19th centuries marked a crucial turning point in colonial policy. Augustus Cleveland, a young British officer, implemented a unique system that emphasized trust and engagement rather than force. This blog highlights the development, rise, and eventual decline of the Cleveland system and the transformation of the Damin-i-Koh region.

Expansion of the Pahariya System Under Augustus Cleveland

• In September 1780, Augustus Cleveland proposed that two parganas (then under royal control) be brought under his direct supervision.
• This proposal was accepted in 1781, extending the Pahariya system to the hill tracts where the population was divided—some residing in the hills, and others living as tenants in zamindari villages.
• In 1782, General Sir Arthur Coote approved Cleveland’s request to form a bow-and-arrow armed military unit of Pahariya youth.
• This unit comprised 1,300 soldiers and was led by Jaurah, a former notorious dacoit turned loyal commander.
• Cleveland claimed Jaurah was the first Pahariya to enter government service and praised his bravery in various missions, including those in the Ramgarh hills.

The Bow-Army’s Success and Cleveland’s Reforms

• Within a year, the bow-armed force proved its utility. In February 1783, Cleveland’s report stated that the military trusted the new administrative framework over the dense jungles.
• Shortly thereafter, Cleveland received permission to:
  • Train the unit like a regular army,
  • Provide arms,
  • And allow Pahariya Manjhi councils to adjudicate local crimes, avoiding standard British courts.

Cleveland’s Legacy and Death

• Cleveland died young at just 29 years old on 13 January 1784.
• His memorial in Bhagalpur praises his peaceful and benevolent methods in civilizing the “wild inhabitants” of Rajmahal.
• The epitaph lauds his non-violent success in winning the hearts of the tribals, making them loyal to the British Crown.
• His efforts were also immortalized in a 150-line poetic drama by Lord Teynmouth in the Asiatic Annual Register (1799).
• He was affectionately called “Chilimili Sahib” by the Pahariyas.
• Cleveland regularly visited them unarmed, roamed the forests, distributed gifts, and hosted communal feasts.

Economic Reforms and Tribal Empowerment

• He organized weekly markets in villages at the foothills.
• Encouraged Pahariyas to sell their products like game, wax, hides, and honey.
• Assured them they would not be taxed and only answerable to their local chiefs.
• A separate memorial to him still stands in front of Bhagalpur Circuit House.

Long-lasting Impact and Gradual Decline

• Cleveland’s policies kept the region peaceful for 40 years.
• A report by Mr. Ward in 1827 confirmed:
  • Crimes were rare,
  • Disputes were quickly resolved,
  • And people were content under the current arrangements.
• After Cleveland’s death, many of his schemes deteriorated:
  • The tribal army, renamed Bhagalpur Hill Rangers, fell into disorder.
  • Pahariya sabhas (councils) became impulsive and authoritarian.
  • Their exemption from formal courts was increasingly questioned.
  • His plans for introducing cottage industries, farming tools, and seeds were abandoned.
  • Schools he established shut down.
  • Market subsidies often did not reach beneficiaries.
  • Zamindars began encroaching on tribal land.

Reforms by Later Administrators

• Marquess of Hastings (Governor General, 1814–1823) tried to revive Cleveland’s initiatives.
• He and Lady Hastings toured the Rajmahal hills and promised farming tools and potato seeds—which were unfortunately never delivered.
• He reopened some schools and re-recognized the Hill Rangers but failed to equip them with rifles.
• Only Mr. Fombell among Cleveland’s successors upheld his vision:
  • In 1795, he successfully incorporated Belpahari and Nooni parganas into the Pahariya administration.
  • Under his leadership, Act I of 1798 was introduced:
    • Major criminal cases were to be heard in tribal councils with a magistrate present.
    • The magistrate acted as Superintendent Officer, authorized to confirm or amend punishments (if less than 14 years).
    • More severe cases were forwarded to the Nizamat Court.

Breakdown and Encroachment

• This system remained in place until 1827, after which the Pahariyas were placed under regular courts.
• Magistrates were assisted by tribal Manjhis acting as tax assessors (Aassers).
• These Manjhis also adjudicated inheritance and land disputes, provided the claim was under Rs. 100.

Administrative Changes Post-Fombell

• After Fombell, the region came under Abdul Rasool Khan, who had earlier served under Captain Brown and Cleveland.
• However, Rasool Khan acted like a local ruler, was called “Kaan Sahib”, and his governance became corrupt and oppressive.
• In 1818, the government appointed Mr. Sutherland to investigate grievances and propose reforms.

Sutherland’s Recommendations and Aftermath

• Mr. Sutherland suggested:
  • Repealing Act I of 1796,
  • Bringing Pahariyas under the regular criminal court system,
  • Applying standard police jurisdiction,
  • And giving Bhagalpur’s magistrate summary authority over civil matters.
• These were approved in 1823.

Survey and Creation of Damin-i-Koh

• In 1824, John Pettiward and Captain Tanner were appointed to survey and demarcate the borders of Damin-i-Koh.
• Survey work concluded in 1823, and in 1837, James Pontet was appointed its superintendent for revenue administration.

James Pontet’s Instructions and the Santhal Migration

• Encouraged to support large-scale Santhal settlement from Birbhum and Singhbhum to clear forests.
• Pontet’s duties (per 1827 orders) included:
  1. Peacefully acquiring forested lands traditionally held by Pahariyas.
  2. Promoting agriculture among Pahariya people.
  3. Granting land rights (jagirs) to local tribal leaders (Sardars, Naibs, Manjhis).
  4. Protecting the Santhals, who fled zamindari oppression.
  5. Reclaiming lands secretly occupied by zamindars.
  6. Encouraging new settlers to clear dense forests and become self-reliant.
  7. Highlighting all potential forest products for government benefit.
  8. Ensuring revenue generation from the above efforts.

The Santhal Uprising of 1855: A Chronicle of Injustice, Exploitation, and Rebellion

The Santhal rebellion of 1855, famously known as the ‘Hul’, was not just a spontaneous outbreak of violence, but the result of decades of exploitation, corruption, and administrative failure. A deeper look into the conditions that led to this revolt reveals a grim picture of colonial greed, misgovernance, and the suffering of an indigenous people.

Economic Exploitation and Revenue Growth under Potent

• The revenue administration under Superintendent James Potent witnessed a sharp increase in revenue—from ₹2,000 to ₹43,919 by 1851.
• This surge was driven by increased Santhal migration and settlement in Damin-i-Koh, spreading across 1,473 villages with a population of 82,795.
• As per the Friend of India, Potent’s territory appeared progressive, but this was a misleading assessment.
• The administrative setup had grown corrupt, leading to widespread injustice against the innocent population.
• These conditions ultimately gave rise to the Santhal Uprising of 1855.

Migration and Settlement of the Santhals

• Santhals migrated from Birbhum to this region between 1790–1810, initially brought in to clear forests and drive out wild animals.
• According to Buchanan Hamilton’s unpublished manuscript, many Santhals, harassed by Birbhum landlords, settled in Dumka around 1809.
• Between 1815–1830, more Santhals arrived; in 1818, Mr. Sutherland found them clearing forests in Godda.
• In 1827, Ward recorded Santhals living on the northern edge of the subdivision.

Santhal Expansion and Conflict Avoidance

• By 1836, according to a report to Bhagalpur’s Collector Dunbar, around 427 villages in Damin-i-Koh were primarily inhabited by Santhals and Bhuiyas.
• Potent encouraged forest clearing, allowing Santhals to settle deep into the Barhait Valley, heart of the Paharia region.
• Santhals faced minimal resistance from Paharias and settled with cattle and grain abundance.
• In contrast, Paharias remained in only select mountainous areas.

Note on the 1855 Rebellion (Hul)

• The uprising was primarily led by Santhals of Damin-i-Koh, with less involvement from Dumka‘s Santhals.
• Root causes included:
  • Deception, exploitation, and extreme oppression.
  • Mahajans (moneylenders) harassed Santhals, with little oversight from corrupt officials.
  • In the absence of British officers, Bengali and non-Santhal outsiders (Dikus) exploited them economically.

Administrative Neglect and Judicial Inaccessibility

• Damin-i-Koh was reorganized and split between Bhagalpur and Birbhum, with a Resident Magistrate based only in Deoghar.
• Potent managed Damin’s revenue affairs, assisted by Nayab Sajwals.
• British officers did not handle civil or criminal cases in the region.
• Santhals had to travel to Deoghar or Bhagalpur for justice, which was both distant and costly.

Debt, Corruption, and Mahajan Exploitation

• Santhals’ spending habits and lack of savings made them easy targets for debt traps.
• Mahajans charged exorbitant interest and often forced debt repayments through illegal means:
  • Using knotted strings to record debts (each knot representing borrowed amount; gaps between knots representing time).
  • Mahajans maintained ledger books and sometimes forged mortgage/sale documents.
  • Instead of legal recovery, they used agents to seize livestock from debtors.
  • Many Santhals lacked property and could not pay taxes, leaving them defenseless.
  • Police investigations, when ordered, rarely benefited Santhals due to their alignment with Mahajans.

Government Vacuum and Systemic Breakdown

• The government had neither judicial nor administrative control over Damin-i-Koh.
• Courthouses were distant, and the officials—clerks, peons, and other staff—were corrupt.
• Even lower administrative officers like Nayab Sajwal and Darogas became agents of exploitation under the influence of Mahajans.
• Santhals compared their neglect with Paharias, who had special laws tailored for them, fueling further resentment.

Demographic Influx and Cultural Landscape

• Santhals migrated to Damin-i-Koh in large numbers during the late 18th century and early 19th century, mainly from:
  • Odisha, Dhalbhum, Manbhum, Barabhum, Palamau, Hazaribagh, Midnapore, Bankura, and Birbhum.
• According to Buchanan Hamilton (1810-11 survey), most settled in Dumka by 1809, with more arriving by 1830.
• In 1851, Captain Sherwill, who visited Murshidabad, Birbhum, and Rajmahal, described Barhait (likely modern Barhet) as the capital of the Paharias, now turned into a Santhal village with:
  • A dense population.
  • A large biweekly market.
  • Trade exchanges with Bengali merchants involving grain, oilseeds, and return goods like money, salt, tobacco, lead, and cloth.
• Sherwill praised Santhals’ simple and obedient lifestyle, removed from modern civilization.

The Spread of the Santhal Rebellion (1855–1857)

• The armed revolt spread rapidly within two years across Birbhum, Bhagalpur, Raniganj, and the Murshidabad border.
• Root causes were embedded in changing socio-economic dynamics and failed British administrative integration.
• Corrupt intermediaries and absence of effective governance led to unchecked exploitation.
• Revenue officials like Potent benefited personally while Nayab Sajwals and Parganaits extorted money from Santhal peasants.

Documented Exploitation and Corruption

• Calcutta Review (1856) reported:
  • Officials collected double the due revenue: e.g., charging ₹6 instead of ₹3 or ₹1 where 4 annas were due.
• A single magistrate was based in Deoghar, with police stations scattered sparsely.
• Police were largely corrupt and exploited common people, barring rare exceptions.
• Officers in secondary positions developed habits of deceiving ordinary people for personal gain.
• Bengal Spectator (1842) and Bengal Journal excerpts expressed similar concerns.

Debt Trap, Lifelong Bondage, and ‘Kamiya’ System

• Court visits were not only difficult but also filled with manipulative staff.
• Santhals’ poor financial habits led to deep entrapment by moneylenders:
  • These Mahajans were mostly non-Santhali outsiders from Birbhum, Bardhaman, Shahabad, and Arrah.
  • They loaned rice, cash, and other essentials at high interest, claiming large portions of Santhals’ produce as repayment.
  • Debts rarely cleared due to steep interest rates.
• Debt Bonds (loan agreements) were prevalent, in which Santhals pledged to repay loans through personal labor.
• This system turned many into bonded laborers, or Kamyas, working under Mahajans without fair wages:
  • Especially during peak agricultural seasons when better-paying work might be available elsewhere.

The Santhal Rebellion (1855–57): A Chronicle of Resistance

The Santhal Rebellion—locally known as “Hul”—was not a spontaneous uprising. It was the result of long-standing socio-economic injustice, exploitation, and spiritual awakening among the Santhal people of Damin-i-Koh, a region between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal. The movement laid bare the brutality of colonial, zamindari, and moneylender oppression.

Below is a comprehensive breakdown of the rebellion’s causes, key events, and aftermath.

Socio-Economic Exploitation

• Kamiyas (bonded laborers) received only food and a piece of cloth annually as wages.
• Upon a Kamiya’s death, his son or closest male relative was forcibly made a Kamiya, continuing the cycle of bondage.
• The interest rates on debts were so high that Santhals remained bonded for life.
• Seeing free laborers earn good wages in railway construction angered the bonded Santhals even more.
• Lands cleared by Santhals from forests for farming or dwelling were not legally protected.
• Dikus (outsiders) were grabbing land by mortgaging it against loans.
• Zamindars began leasing out Santhal lands to others.

Systemic Oppression

• A collusive system of exploitation was formed by zamindars, their agents, chaprasis, moneylenders, middlemen, police, and administrative officials.
• Usurious lending practices involved interest rates from 50% to 100%.
• Market frauds, intentional destruction of crops, and debt traps were common.
• Bonded labor (Kamiya Pratha) was rampant.
• Even the British railway officials’ behavior fueled Santhal resentment.

Brewing Discontent

• According to the 1856 Calcutta Review, the situation in Damin-i-Koh had become so volatile that the Santhals’ patience could break at any time.
• Just before the rebellion, some Santhals had turned into bandits to protest their exploitation.
• In 1854, moneylenders were looted in Littipara (Pakur), Kusuma (Barhait), and other areas.
• Daroga Mahesh Lal Dutt of Dighi Thana, posted since 1835, punished the Santhal looters—but took no action against the exploitative moneylenders.
• This intensified Santhal anger further.
• By early 1855, around 6,000 to 7,000 Santhals from Birbhum, Bankura, Chotanagpur, and Hazaribagh gathered to avenge their punished comrades.

Divine Spark: Spiritual Mobilization

• A divine spark came in the form of four brothers—Sidhu, Kanhu, Chand, and Bhairav, landless villagers from Bhognadih.
• They claimed to receive visions from a god, who appeared as a fair-skinned Thakur in Santhal attire with twenty fingers.
• The god left messages on 20 paper slips, divided into five parts.
• Two more divine figures with six fingers explained the messages and vanished.
• The god reportedly appeared again in various forms—a flame, a wheel, a book, and a knife.
• A mud temple was built, topped with a wheel, where villagers were asked to offer grains, milk, and animal sacrifices.
• The papers and books shown were later identified as being related to Christianity.
• Messages were sent to all Manjhis (tribal heads) of Damin-i-Koh with sal tree branches, a sign to assemble.

30 June 1855: The Call for Unity

• On 30 June 1855, a full moon night, 10,000 Santhals gathered at Bhognadih to hear the divine command.
• Letters were reportedly sent to government officials, darogas, zamindars, and others.
• Santhals denied any anti-government intent but declared that:
  • They would collect tax at new rates and submit it to the government.
  • New tax rates:
    • Two annas per buffalo plough
    • One anna per bullock plough
    • Half anna per cow plough
  • Interest rate on loans would be one paisa per rupee per year.
• The message was clear: Santhals wanted control over Damin-i-Koh.
• Sidhu and Kanhu declared themselves “Subah” or divine representatives.

Open Rebellion Begins

• On 7 July, Daroga Mahesh Lal Dutt reached Panch Kothia near Barhait after hearing about Santhal gatherings.
• Santhals refused to disperse and ordered the daroga to collect ₹5 levy from each Bengali family nearby.
• On refusal, the daroga ordered arrest of Sidhu and Kanhu.
• Santhals retaliated by beheading Mahesh Lal Dutt with axes.
• Soon after, they killed Daroga Pratap Narayan of Kotkoria Thana, Godda Subdivision, at Jonarchuk.
• Panic spread as far as Bhagalpur.

British Reaction and Spread of Revolt

• Magistrate H.E. Richardson, Superintendent Potent, and railway engineer Vigor hid in a house that was once Shuja’s palace.
• The area was fortified until reinforcements arrived.
• Commissioner F. Brown quickly:
  • Reinforced Bhagalpur
  • Alerted hill chieftains and zamindars
  • Asked Bengal and Bihar officials for help

Fierce Santhal Resistance

• Major F.W. Burrough’s unit from Bhagalpur clashed with Santhals at Piyalpur near Pirpainti.
• Despite being armed only with bows, arrows, and axes, Santhals defeated the British unit.
• The rebellion spread from Kolgong (west) to Rajmahal (east) and from Raniganj to Saithia (south).

Attacks on Colonial and Zamindari Establishments

• Looting occurred in Pakur and its eastern and southeastern regions.
• The house of Pakur zamindar at Jhikar Hati was burned.
• Rebels moved toward Murshidabad district, attacking:
  • The indigo factory of Charles Messack at Kadamsar
  • But Messack repelled them with help from his brother Henry (owner of Dhulia indigo factory) and 160 armed police.

Military Suppression

• Berhampur magistrate Mr. Togood led 400 soldiers from the 7th Native Infantry, starting 11 July.
• By 13 July, rebels had vacated Kadamsar; he pursued them to Palsa (Birbhum).
• Rebels reached Maheshpur, capturing the local Raja’s palace.
• On 17 July, Togood defeated 3,000 rebels; Sidhu, Kanhu, and Bhairav were injured; 200 Santhals died.
• At Tarai River (west of Pakur), 200 British troops defeated 5,000 rebels.
• Rebels retreated to the hills, but were defeated again at Raghunathpur on the Barharwa–Barhait road.
• Bhognadih village was burned.
• On 24 July, rebels temporarily captured Barhait.

Decline of the Rebellion

• Shortly after, Sidhu was betrayed by his companions and handed over to British forces.
• By 20 July, the rebellion had spread across:
  • Southwestern Birbhum (Taldanga to Trunk Road)
  • Southeastern areas from Saithia to Bhagalpur and Rajmahal
• To contain the uprising:
  • Reinforcements were sent south of the Damodar River.
  • All forces were placed under Brigadier-General Lloyd.
  • Colonel Bird was given special command of troops in Bankura and Birbhum.
• The British did not allow martial law, but:
  • By mid-August, rebels were pushed out of northern Bhagalpur.
  • Peace was restored in parts of the south.

Persistent Resistance in the Jungles

• Even after repeated crackdowns, around 30,000 Santhal rebels remained active.
• They used guerrilla tactics, launching attacks and retreating into the forests.
• Rainy seasons made it particularly hard for the British to chase them.

Appointment of Special Commissioner

• On 6 August, A.C. Bidwell, Commissioner of Nadia Division, was appointed Special Commissioner to crush the rebellion completely.
• On 17 August, a declaration by Bidwell once again angered the rebels, triggering another wave of the uprising in September.

Rebel Control and British Response

• By the end of September, areas from Deoghar to the southwestern border were under rebel control.
• On 10 November, Martial Law was declared in heavily affected districts: Bhagalpur, Murshidabad, and Birbhum.
• Large numbers of British troops were deployed, overwhelming the Santhals, who were weakened by hunger and disease.
• Rebels retreated to the forests again.

Capture of Leaders

• Most Santhal leaders were arrested.
• Kanhu was captured by the Ghatwal (chief) of Kunjra at Banda, north of Jamtara.
• By 3 January 1856, the rebellion was largely suppressed, and Martial Law was lifted.
• Sporadic resistance continued but was subdued by the end of winter.

Execution of Heroes

• Sidhu was hanged in Barhait.
• Kanhu was hanged in Bhognadih.

Tales of Valor and Bravery

• Santhals, despite lacking modern weapons, displayed remarkable courage:
  • In one incident, they captured a government courier, looted the mail, and sent him back with a three-leafed Sal branch, signaling an attack in three days.
  • In another, 45 rebels took shelter in a mud hut and refused to surrender. They responded to gunfire with arrows.
  • Only one elderly man survived. He attacked with an axe and killed a soldier before being overpowered.

Role of the Paharias

• The Paharias remained detached from the Santhal cause.
• After the Santhals attacked and drove out locals, the Paharias looted the area and fled.
• The Santhals rarely gained anything from these conquests.

Struggles of the Santhal Worldview

• Santhals couldn’t understand why a third party (the British) had come between them and their ancestral land and forests.
• They desired to reclaim their land, forests, and traditions.
• Bureaucratic systems (Hakim, Amla, Vakil) were alien to them.
• Petitions often received no response for years.

Root Causes of Rebellion

• Santhals revolted against:
  • Officials,
  • Moneylenders,
  • Zamindars, and
  • Other agents of the British administration.
• Though suppressed, the rebellion exposed deep flaws in British governance.

British Realization and Reforms

• The government acknowledged that Bengal Presidency laws were unsuitable for tribal-dominated regions like Damin-i-Koh.
• The Santhal Hool was a clear sign of rising discontent due to administrative and economic pressures.
• This sparked a new administrative chapter in Bengal and Bihar.

Regulation of 1855 and Creation of Santhal Pargana

• In response, Regulation XXXVII of 1855 was introduced:
  • Removed the old administrative system from Damin-i-Koh and tribal districts.
  • Formed a new district – Santhal Pargana, separated from Bhagalpur and Birbhum.
  • Included four subdivisions: Dumka, Godda, Deoghar, and Rajmahal.
  • Judicial powers were given to the Deputy Commissioner and four Assistant Commissioners.

Police Reforms of 1856

• Under the 1856 Police Rules:
  • Village headmen (Mukhias) were empowered as police officials.

A Revolutionary New System

The new system focused on three main principles:

1. No intermediaries between the Santhals and Assistant Commissioners.
2. Oral complaints could be registered even without written petitions or in the absence of formal staff.
3. In all criminal matters, Santhals themselves could act against accused persons brought to court with witnesses.

Building Direct Government-People Contact

• A direct connection between administration and the public was established.
• Under Deputy Commissioner Ashley Eden and Commissioner George Yule, this system proved so effective that:
  • Santhals did not join the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny.
  • However, recruiting Santhals into police remained difficult.

Objections and Boundary Disputes

• Later, Zamindars and Raiyats opposed the application of Regulation XXXVII in some areas.
• In places like Purnia, Malda, and Murshidabad, Santhals were in the minority.
• The Bengali-to-Santhal ratio was about 7:1 in some regions.

Recommendations for Territorial Adjustments

• On 19 November 1856, the Bengal Government’s Junior Secretary wrote to legislative councillor E. Currie, citing the need to amend the existing regulation.
• Based on George Yule’s letter (17 July 1856), suggestions included:
  1. Remove from Santhal area:
     • Haripur, Noni, Mullarpur, Dureen, Moliser in Birbhum,
     • Kolgong pargana in Bhagalpur (excluding Tappa Munhira).
  2. Define Santal Pargana’s northern boundary from Teliagarhi to Farrukhabad, avoiding river crossings for administrative clarity.
  3. Transfer Bahadurpur (east of the Ganges but inside Santhal region) to Malda.
  4. Empower the Lieutenant Governor to exclude areas of Kolgong or Bhagalpur deemed unsuitable.

Legislative Changes and Final Formation

• Based on these recommendations, the amended bill was passed as Act X of 1857.
• It redrew the boundaries of Santhal Pargana.
• The first Deputy Commissioner was Ashley Eden, followed by Thomson and William Robinson.

Legacy of the Santhal Rebellion

The Santhal Hool may have been militarily subdued, but its spiritual victory lay in reshaping colonial governance and laying the foundation of Santhal Pargana, an administrative region that recognized tribal identity, rights, and culture.